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Low fertility in Italy has diseconomies that are widely recognized, but public transfers to 
families and children are way below the EU average. A proposal that could have pro-natalist 
effects envisages the creation of a fund for each newborn  that would be accrued by yearly 
public transfers (and, within limits, by donations of relatives). Up to fifty percent of the 
yearly transfer can be used by the family in order to support the child. The fund comes to 
maturity when the child comes of age: at this point the young may use it in order to improve 
his education, as a startup for an economic activity or for any other productive use. 


















      
Italian fertility is very low, and has been for a long time, and an upturn that gradually 
brought it close to replacement levels would be desirable. To obtain this, a contribution 
needs to be made by ‘policy’, namely the strategic set of government decisions that regulate 
the financial, economic, juridical and social functioning of society. 
On the micro level, it can be observed that the expectations of young people and couples 
are oriented towards having more children than they actually have, and this gap, even 
though it may in part be fictitious, is conditioned by economic and social constraints of 
various levels and kinds. On the macro level, a low birth rate creates serious diseconomies 
because it has a strong impact on the age structure and determines the unsustainability of 
social welfare systems and of the rules governing transfers between generations. An ageing 
labour force also has negative effects on productivity. These disadvantages are undoubtedly 
greater than the advantages that would derive from a smaller and less dense population, 
which are the long-term consequences of below replacement fertility. Immigration may 
offset the negative consequences of low fertility, because society can reproduce itself both 
biologically (with births) and socially (through immigration) – but too high an immigration 
rate tends to create further diseconomies. Taken together, these points lead to the conclusion 
that the low birth rate is ‘a problem’, therefore justifying the interest of policy-makers.  
Naturally the scope for policy action is very restricted, because one cannot exercise 
coercion in the sphere of individual choices, and excessive pressure on individual 
preferences is not acceptable either. Moreover, the results of policies are uncertain, as the 
history of the twentieth century demonstrates. However, two interrelated principles justify 
state action. The first is that children born as a result of individual choice and as a ‘private 
good’ are also a collectively beneficial ‘public good’. The second principle is that of 
responsibility towards later generations, whose welfare would be compromised by the low 
fertility of previous generations. This responsibility invokes corrective measures for the 
current situation (Livi Bacci 1997). 
If these principles are accepted, there is an area within which policies may act in order to 
increase fertility levels, reducing the gap between expected or desired family size and the 
number of children that individuals actually have, thus minimizing externalities. However, 
the margin for action is very narrow, because policies (as defined above) have to operate in 
accordance with the liberal-democratic principles governing our society, because there must 
be wide consensus for them and (above all) because their impact, though uncertain, is 
presumably of modest proportions.  
 
1 – RATIONAL CHOICES AND COSTS/BENEFITS 
   3
  In order to come up with good policies it is necessary to have a reasonable 
understanding of the set of causes of low fertility in order to remove or mitigate their effect. 
Theoretical discussion on this issue is very intense (McDonald 2002), and it is not my 
intention to venture into this debate here. However, there is definitely one common 
paradigm: we expect individuals and couples to make their procreative choices rationally, 
based on an appreciation, albeit imperfect, of the costs and benefits of reproduction. 
Evaluation of costs and benefits is, however, problematic for various reasons, including the 
following: 
the costs and benefits are not only economic but also psychological and value- 
related; 
they are marked by uncertainty; 
they are prolonged in time and difficult to actualize. 
In theory, it is possible to measure the economic costs and benefits: raising children has 
an evident direct cost, even though assessment of this is complex. The amount of time 
devoted by parents to rearing children has a cost-opportunity with a calculable value; the 
economic benefits that children bring in terms of future transfers, protection against the 
risks of old age, assistance and support are uncertain, but they can be assessed in 
probabilistic terms and can influence reproductive choices. In any case, all these items can, 
with some mathematical gymnastics, be expressed in monetary terms. The situation is very 
different when the costs and benefits are psychological or loaded with idealistic values, the 
evaluation of which is problematic. But the “idea is that the psychological benefits (for 
example, reciprocal love or the desire to continue one’s line) must be weighed up together 
with the psychological costs, including worries, the possible consequences for the woman’s 
health, a reduced social life and so on. The net sum of these non-economic factors is one of 
the elements that influences fertility” (De Santis and Livi Bacci 2001). It follows that the 
interpretation of reproductive choices cannot be based on purely economic considerations 
nor on explanations found exclusively at the psychological or ideal level. The two levels are 
closely related: without doubt, efforts by the state to support reproduction may influence the 
value of children in ideal terms (or at least the perception thereof), which is enhanced in a 
favourable situation and depressed in a hostile one. Purely psychological and social 
interpretations of low fertility as a consequence of the affirmation of post-materialist values 
centred on self-fulfilment may also translate into the paradigm of rational choices. One has 
fewer children because the presence of an additional child raises the price of individual 
fulfilment; however, it may be that in a subsequent historic phase this ‘fulfilment’ depends 
precisely on having an additional child. 
Reproductive choices must be inserted into the system of the new market economy 
(McDonald 2002), a model to which European societies are struggling to adapt. As a large 
proportion of the population (especially men) still enjoy considerable protection, “the safest 
strategy, for women and young people, is to enter the system and delay or avoid having a 
family”. McDonald continues: “Market theory considers individuals as inputs into the 
production system. As a consequence, to safeguard themselves against risks, individuals 
must maximize their use to the market. This means that they must concentrate on acquiring 
skills, work experience and a monetizable reputation. They must also be capable of 
flexibility in time and space in order to grasp opportunities as they arise. In a world that 
rewards capitalist production, anyone wanting to avoid risk is warned not to devote time and 
money to reproduction. For those who are risk-averse, it is imprudent to be altruistic in a 
market economy”. The market economy is not in a position to re-establish the balance: even 
if (in theory) the scarcity of births (and later of manpower) led to an increase in the value of 
children, this re-equilibrium would occur over a very long time span and would be unable to 
attenuate the serious problems generated by a distorted age structure.   4
What emerges from this set of considerations is that the scale of social re-equilibrium 
required to have an impact on fertility must be very considerable. The “failure” of the 
market in Europe and Japan is evident because these societies have not ensured the 
replacement of the population over the last generation or so.  
 
 
2 – SOME USEFUL AND THOUGHT-PROVOKING ARITHMETIC  
 
The characteristics of Italy’s low fertility are well known, and although there are some 
distinctive aspects, they fall within a context covering much of Europe. Very briefly, some 
of these characteristics are as follows. 
-  The period total fertility rate (TFR) has been below the replacement level since 
1977, below 1.5 since 1984 and below 1.3 since 1993 (Figure 1). 
-  The TFR of generations born in the second half of the 60s will settle, when the 
final figures are available, at around 1.4 children per woman (Figure 2). 
-  Average age at childbirth has increased greatly: on a period basis it was around 
27.5 years in the second half of the 1970s (about 2 years less than in the 1950s) and about 3 
years higher in 2000 (Figure 1). In the 1945–55 cohorts it was 27 years, then it topped 29 
among women born in 1965 (Figure 2). The other indicators of tempo (average age at first 
marriage and average age at birth of first child) are also delay-oriented. 
-  Cohort after cohort, the proportion of women that do not marry and do not have 
children has been increasing. In the 1932–1955 generations, the proportion of women 
unmarried at age 50 oscillated between 4% and 10%, while the estimates for the 1965–67 
generations place the figure at over 20%. The proportion of childless women – 12–13% for 
the 1945–55 generations – has also increased, touching 20% in 1965. 
-  Unions are still prevalently marital; however, cohabitation is increasing in 
younger generations, even though such unions are still a clear minority. Less than one birth 
in ten occurs outside marriage (one in six in Spain, one in four in Germany, one in two in 
the Scandinavian and Baltic countries). The relative “robustness” of marriage is underlined 
by the low divorce rate (about one marriage in ten ends in divorce); however, the 
vulnerability of unions is much higher if one considers that one in four marriages ends with 
a formal separation.  
In general, as elsewhere in Europe, the cycles of anticipation and delay in the 
reproductive process have resulted in cycles of expansion and depression of period fertility, 
with a negative contribution of 0.2–0.3 points to the current low TFR. The TFR, “adjusted” 
(quantum) (Bongaarts and Feeney 1999) for the calendar changes of different birth-orders 
(tempo), was approximately 0.3 higher in the 1990s than the period TFR (1.51 compared to 
1.19 in 1995: Livi Bacci and Salvini 2000).  
Note that a return of period fertility to a value of 1.5 (quantum) would imply an increase 
in births of some 120,000 units per year (there were 535,000 in 2002; 40,000 births per 
decimal point of TFR). In other words, a “step back” of the delay at more or less the same 
pace as the “step forward” of the last two decades would mean an increase of approximately 
one million births in a twenty-year period. A policy that succeeded in reversing the process 
of delay without seeking to influence couples’ choice about how many children to have 
(granting for the sake of argument that fertility and calendar objectives are independent) 
could achieve a highly significant quantitative result. 
If on the other hand one wishes to influence the quantum, that is the level of fertility 
after adjustment for tempo, the problem is obviously different. In this case, a certain 
proportion of women need “shifting” from one parity to the next. Simplifying somewhat, 
one might say that the quantum of fertility at the end of the 1990s (TFR = 1.5) consists of 
the four-fifths of women who pass from parity 0 to parity 1 (20 women out of 100 therefore   5
remain childless); almost two-thirds of women of parity 1 that reach parity 2 (30 women 
have just 1 child) and the two-fifths of women of parity 2 that reach parity 3 and over (30 
women with 2 children and 20 with 3). A policy that managed to convince 10% of women 
in each parity to have one more child would mean an increase in the TFR from 1.5 to 1.6; 
20% would mean an increase to 1.7 and so on. To reach 2 (almost the replacement level) it 
would be necessary to convince 50% of couples to have an additional child. Naturally the 
reasons that induce women (couples) to stop at 0, 1, 2 or more children – and the strength of 
conviction that might induce them to have another one – are diverse and could orient 
intervention towards specific, differentiated or selective measures resulting from difficult 
policy decisions. For example, one might imagine that the motivation for having the first 
child is the desire to satisfy the instinct for parenthood; the predominant reason for having a 
second child might be to give the first one some company; for 3 or more children, the 
motivation might be the satisfaction of a natural inclination to have a large family. If policy 
were to be considered non-influential regarding decisions to have one or three children, 
because these are more closely related to “natural” predispositions, it would be rational to 
concentrate efforts and resources on convincing as many people as possible to have a 
second child. But if the passage from one parity to another depended only on the difficulty 
of reconciling work and family, or on purely income-based considerations, there would be 
no grounds for differentiated policies.  
 
3 – EUROPE COMPARED AND THE CASE OF ITALY 
 
In some European countries – the Scandinavian nations, France – state support for 
reproduction is more developed overall than elsewhere on the continent (Kamerman et al. 
1998; Gauthier 2002). This is true on various levels. Above all, there is the historic 
dimension, given the efforts of these states at least since the end of the Second World War, 
which have either been oriented specifically towards supporting the birth rate (France) or 
justified by the construction of a fair system of transfers towards families with children, 
single parents, working women (Sweden, Norway). Moreover, support in these countries is 
also developed horizontally, in the sense that social welfare, fiscal and labour policies are 
oriented, when not coordinated, in a way that is favourable to having children. Finally, the 
support is vertically significant as well, because the financial commitment is much greater 
than elsewhere. Then there are countries, like the Mediterranean ones, which despite the 
prolonged existence of non-democratic and formally pro-family regimes (Portugal, Spain) 
or of governments led by Catholic political forces (Italy), have done little to sustain 
reproduction. It is not possible here to offer a detailed examination of the structure, scope, 
effectiveness and impact of the various policies. I will limit myself to using a succinct 
indicator (developed by Eurostat: Eurostat 2003), namely the incidence of social welfare 
spending per family and children in proportion to total welfare spending, or to GNP, the 
hypothesis being that this financial indicator is correlated to the “effort” made by society 
and the public system of each country to support reproduction. Spending on “family and 
children” is defined by Eurostat as “the support in money or kind (excluding health) for 
pregnancy, childbirth or adoption, child-raising and support for other members of the 
family” (Eurostat 2003: 54). In 2000, the incidence of this spending with respect to total 
social welfare spending was about 12% for the average of the Scandinavian countries and 
France, compared to just 5% for the Mediterranean countries (3.8% in Italy); per-capita 
spending was six times greater in the former than in the latter (930 euros compared to 154; 
188 in Italy). Figure 3 shows, for the 15 EU countries plus Norway, Iceland and 
Switzerland, the relation between the incidence of social spending and the TFR in 2000. As 
can be seen, there is a direct relation between the two indicators. Figures 4 and 5, on the 
other hand, show the course of period and cohort TFR in the two groups of countries. The   6
gap between the two curves – compared to the rapid decline in the Mediterranean countries, 
fertility has “held up” in the Scandinavian countries and France in the last twenty years 
(period TFR) and in the cohorts born after 1950 – is worthy of more than just passing 
consideration. 
If one also includes transfers for housing, the incidence of social welfare spending 
directly or indirectly related to the family and to children (out of total social welfare 
spending) in countries like France and Sweden is almost ten points higher than in Italy. 
These data suggest that considerable resources need to be invested in policies to support 
families and children in Italy. In addition, recent research (Perali 1999; De Santis and 
Maltagliati 2002) estimates the cost of an additional child to be around 20% of family 
income. This figure suggests that if policies were to pursue redistributory and equalization 
goals between families with children and families without children, the shift in resources 
would need to be very considerable. Further points of interest arise from analysis of 
generational accounts for typical families. A calculation has been made of the “net marginal 
subsidy” (NMS), defined as the “difference between the net taxes (that is the balance of 
taxes after transfers have been deducted) paid by a family with n children and those paid by 
a household of the same type with one less child” (Sartor et al. 2001; Sartor et al. 2002; 
Sartor 2003). This subsidy reflects direct and indirect effects. The former relate to monetary 
benefits (family allowance, for example) and benefits in kind (education, health) for 
children. The latter refer to tax changes due to the presence of an additional child and due to 
changes in consumptions, in living arrangements, in sources of income etc. The results refer 
to 4 types of family (man an employee and woman at home; a variant of this, where the man 
is self-employed; both partners work; only the woman works). The results show that in 
families where one or both partners are employees, the NMS is the same when one moves 
from not having children to having one, and from one to two, but decreases sharply when 
moving to the third child. For the other two types of family, the subsidy decreases for the 
second and third child. Basically, the weight of net transfers is inverse to the order of birth 
and has an anti-natalist effect. Naturally, in reading this result, which deserves further study, 
it needs to be “juxtaposed”, as it were, with the direct cost for the family of each additional 
child. Such a reading is difficult from a technical and methodological point of view, but it 
reinforces the conviction that the system of transfers exacerbates the disadvantage for 
families with children in comparison with those who have fewer or none. It seems that 
modern systems of transfer contain an intrinsic fertility-negative drift and that, if one 
examines things from a purely economic point of view, it is much more advantageous not to 
have children (or to have fewer than average).  
  The above points lead us back to a fundamental observation: policies to support 
reproduction cost a lot. Although the arguments vary, this opinion is shared by a number of 
important authors (McDonald 2002; Chesnais 1999; Demeny 1986). 
   
4 – SOME REFLECTIONS ON RECET SURVEYS 
 
  One of the main objectives of the survey undertaken by the Venus research project, 
which examined the attitudes of a sample of women with children in the cities of Udine, 
Padua, Florence, Pesaro and Messina, was to try to understand the reasons for their decision 
to stop childbearing. An attempt was also made to investigate the respondents’ views on 
hypothetical policies to support families with children. As regards the reasons for not having 
an additional child, “all the ones relating to financial, time and work constraints, either 
separately or linked, were mentioned by at least one fifth of the interviewees” (Lines 2002), 
while those regarding health problems, different preferences or the fragility of the union 
come last. The most frequent reasons given can therefore be traced, directly or indirectly, to 
the “cost” of a child, even if this conclusion is partially contradicted by the fact that (in   7
response to another question) women (with 1, 2 or 3 children) reporting that their economic 
position had improved after the birth of a child were more numerous than those who said 
that it had worsened. However, this result can be explained by the fact that family living 
standards increase with age and that answers to this question might have been inspired by a 
long- rather than a short-term perspective. 
But how would women have reacted if, in the past, they had been able to benefit from 
government measures to support children? The women were asked if “they would have 
considered having another child” in the presence of four alternative measures: a) high 
family allowance (750 euros) until the child is three; b) the possibility for one of the parents 
to stay at home for three years, maintaining their income and the right to return to work; c) 
family allowance (250 euros) until the child reaches sixteen; d) the availability of flexible, 
full-time nurseries, kindergartens and schools at a low cost. A significant percentage of 
women stated that they would have been responsive to incentives of this kind, which – if 
applied – might have led to a higher fertility of approximately 0.2–0.3 children (Breschi and 
De Santis 2002). Dalla Zuanna and Salvini (2002) observe: “The policies that have been 
most successful are those which enable couples to look after their children rather than those 
that pay substantial child benefits to parents. It may be that in this choice there is a certain 
reluctance about admitting that economic considerations have great weight in fertility 
decisions. However, these data are not at odds with those regarding the reasons for not 
having had another child. Money is important but the difficulty of “looking after the new 
child and the ones we already have” is also important, perhaps above all else. Almost 60% 
of women with one child and almost 50% of those with two children affirm that they would 
have had another child if they had been able to stay home from work for three years on a 
full salary and with the guarantee of being able to keep their job”. And it is highly probable 
that flexibility and the possibility of being able to return to work is greatly appreciated. It 
has also rightly been pointed out (Lines 2002) that, from the government’s point of view, it 
would be useful to know the shadow salary – as a percentage of salaries previously received 
– which, combined with the guarantee of being able to return to work, would encourage 
working women to have another child. As regards family benefits, a moderate level of 
benefits for sixteen years was greatly preferred to a much higher level of benefits for just 
three years. Women with one child were more “responsive” to the various measures than 
those with two, which is “fairly predictable because many surveys have shown that the great 
majority of Italian couples declare that they want two children” (Dalla Zuanna and Salvini 
2002). 
When considering the results of these and similar surveys, it is of course important not 
to forget their limitations: they report opinions about hypothetical actions in the past, which 
are subject to rationalization with the benefit of hindsight and which have only been elicited 
from women. However, they reveal that reproductive choices are not the consequence of 
ironclad and non-modifiable ideological decisions. The situation is a bit different when it 
comes to women who were still childless towards the end of their fertile lives, as shown by 
another survey carried out in the same cities. What emerges from this survey (Tanturri and 
Mencarini 2002) is that over one third of childless women have never tried to have children 
even though they were in a union (37% had never entered union and 29% had entered union 
and tried to have a child. Were these women therefore non-fertile by choice? In some cases, 
observe the two authors, “what are perceived by women as benefits relating to motherhood 
are considered insufficient to offset the high costs involved in having a child, which are 
partly financial but above all are costs in terms of time and sacrifices”. As regards policy 
measures (see above) and their ability to induce “deliberately” non-fertile women to have a 
child, “it seems that the proposed measures, even if very generous, would have changed the 
minds of just a small minority of respondents. The measures with greater relative theoretical 
efficacy are parental leave and full pay for three years from birth, and the offer of full-time,   8
flexible kindergartens and schooling at a reasonable cost”. It may be, however, that for these 
women the rationalization, at a later date, of the decision not to have children is stronger in 
these cases than it is with mothers in relation to another child 
Further considerations stem from the analysis of other aspects of the surveys mentioned 
above. For example, with regard to the effects of the asymmetry of female/male roles on 
time constrictions, perceived as one of the most significant factors in procreative choices, it 
emerges clearly that the “burden of family work, in situations where there is an asymmetry 
in childcare roles, is associated by working mothers with lower fertility (other factors such 
as education, religiosity and participation in work being constant). Families where the father 
does more in terms of household duties and looking after the children have an extra child 
with greater frequency. The most important element appears to be flexibility, adaptability 
and the willingness of men to accept a redistribution, albeit partial, of care-giving duties in 
the face of new requirements in terms of time and family tasks that stem from the birth of a 
child, with a consequent “dual presence” for the male as well” (Mencarini and Tanturri 
2002). This is of course an area where active policies have their limits, but it confirms the 
significance of intra-family asymmetry in low fertility, especially in an institutional and 
social context where sufficiently vigorous efforts are not made to remove it. It is hard not to 
think that this asymmetry is perpetuated by the almost pathological delay with which young 
people leave their family of origin. 
Another interesting point emerges from combining the response to the question about 
women’s financial contribution to the family budget after the birth of the first, second and 
third child and the response to another question about who, after the child’s birth, took care 
of it during the day. Over half of the women with one or two children contributed 
significantly to the family budget. For these women the help of the grandmother (or another 
member of the family) was essential in providing primary care for the child (almost 50% of 
cases for women with two children). State-run childcare facilities were used in a minority of 
cases, as were paid babysitters. If any further proof were required, the usefulness of 
adequate state-run facilities, which are currently wanting, emerged quite clearly. The 
shortcomings of these facilities are aggravated by the fact that a number of women working 
full-time choose not to use public services, either because they are not elegible for 
subsidized fees because their income exceeds a given threshold or because the opening 
hours of the facilities do not cover the whole working day (Lines 2002). 
What emerges in general is that a majority of women choose to work and be mothers, 
even though “employment significantly reduces the probability of having a second or a third 
child. These results seem to suggest that – at least until the second child – work is an 
essential source of family income and that the dual role of women is often indispensable. 
The decision to have a third child seems to be influenced more by value-related factors than 
by financial considerations, the result, that is, of the woman’s desire to maintain other, non-
family-related roles” (Ongaro and Salvini 2002). 
 
5 – THE PATHS OF PUBLIC ACTION 
 
Surveys confirm what everyday experience suggests: reproductive choices are not, 
except in a minority of cases, the consequence of immutable principles and values. They 
may be so for some couples who decide not to reproduce, and for others for whom a large 
number of offspring is an ideal, an objective, even an imperative. But in the majority of 
cases, reproductive choices are the consequence of a complex assessment of costs and 
benefits (economic and psychological), which are strongly influenced by the social and 
economic context. The majority of women, and of couples, are liable to modify their 
behaviours. While the state can modify the welfare of couples it should not attempt to 
manipulate values and preferences directly. With reference to possible pronatal policies in   9
England in the 1940s, Harrod wrote that “the most effective method open to the state to 
bring about a spiritual change is by applying a material remedy. The average citizen will not 
be impressed by propaganda, but he will be impressed by action” (Archives 2001). 
As for the “tool kit” of policies, McDonald has produced a simple and efficient 
classification that distinguishes between three categories of intervention (McDonald 2002): 
-  Financial incentives, which include periodic allocations (e.g., family allowances), 
rewards and loans, tax relief and tax credit, subsidized or free children’s services, housing 
benefits. 
-  Measures to reconcile work and family, namely paternity and maternity leave, 
crèches, kindergartens and nursery schools, flexible working hours, leave for family reasons, 
gender equity. 
-  Major social changes favouring childhood and child-raising, including 
employment measures for women and young people, steps to facilitate the start of unions, 
gender equity, a favourable environment for children and in general for the development of 
positive attitudes towards childhood and child-rearing functions. 
The advantages and disadvantages of individual measures can only be evaluated if there 
is a general and coordinated plan, where objectives, time scales and resources are specified. 
Otherwise, discussion on the merits of individual policy actions is an abstract exercise. 
While awaiting such a plan, three priorities can be pinpointed with considerable confidence. 
These concern the relations between work, reproduction and child-caring; the easing of the 
delay syndrome; and a coherent reform of the system of transfers in support of families with 
children. I will make a number of points about the first two issues and devote greater 
attention to the third. 
 
 
6 – WORK, REPRODUCTION, CHILD-CARING 
 
Female employment rates are increasing, as is the proportion of families that rely on a 
dual income. The level of women’s education and training is rising, and with it the 
opportunity-cost of time. The asymmetry of gender roles within the family is slowly being 
eroded. In societies where the welfare system has provided greater safeguards for women’s 
employment, lack of work is a reason for not having children and the traditional negative 
relationship between work and fertility is becoming positive (Rindfuss et al. 2000; De Santis 
and Livi Bacci 2001). The surveys conducted as part of the Venus research project confirm 
that reproduction and work are still dichotomous rather than synergic. A number of 
recommendations have also been made (Lines 2002; Mencarini and Tanturri 2002), which 
can briefly be summed up as follows: 
-  Extension of maternity leave to cover the first year of the child’s life. 
-  Adequate periods of leave for one of the two partners/workers for the second and 
third year of the child’s life, with a subsidized salary (up to 75–80%, with a maximum 
salary cap). 
-  Subsidies and incentives for employers who set up nurseries in the workplace or 
nearby. 
-  Possibility for mothers to remain within the pension system after maternity leave 
until the child is three, even if the mother does not work. If the mother is not a beneficiary 
of the pension system, recognition of ‘credits’ for the working partner. 
-  Incentives to enable women to work part time until the child enters primary 
school. 
-  Subsidies for companies that employ women who stay at home to bring up their 
children.   10
-   Lower fees for public childcare structures for children from 1 to 6 years old, 
giving priority to women who work full-time over those who work part-time, and to those 
who work part-time over those who do not work; opening hours that match work schedules. 
Quite apart from the cost-related difficulties of implementing such measures, it can be 
observed that they would need to be activated together, even if gradually, in order to exert a 
critical force. However, it should also be remembered that certain measures cannot easily be 
applied to the growing number of women who are self-employed or have jobs. Nonetheless, 
action of this kind would have the effect of reducing the cost of children, easing time 
restrictions, reinforcing women’s confidence and removing what are regarded as insuperable 
obstacles by a large number of women who would like to have a child, or another child, but 
who decide not to.  
 
7 – THE DELAY SYNDROME 
 
  The delay in transition to adulthood is another strong restriction on the realization of 
reproductive programmes. A great deal has already been written about the “syndrome of 
delay” amongst young Italians and young people from other Mediterranean countries, and 
surveys have been conducted to identify the rhythms, behaviours and primary factors of this 
delay. What stands out in particular is that the typical profile of transition to independence 
consists of successive, linked steps: education and training; the search for a job; 
independence from the family and independent housing arrangements (De Sandre et al. 
1997; Aassve et al. 2001). Each of these steps must be completed by the two partners before 
the decision is taken to form a stable union, which is the presupposition for reproductive 
choices. In the last two decades, various circumstances have led to a prolonging of each 
phase and consequently of the whole process. There are varying views about how this delay 
should be assessed. Some people, including this writer, consider that the delay is becoming 
pathological, while others (Barbagli, Castiglioni, Dalla Zuanna 2003) point to the positive 
aspects for the well-being of parents and children. But there is full agreement that the delay 
has a negative effect on fertility, because postponing choices tends to frustrate or downscale 
the reproduction plans of the couple – due to health or subfertility problems, the greater 
burden of looking after children, the lack of time. In addition to this “mechanical” effect 
there is also that of cost. There is a growing perception of the long-term and gradually 
increasing financial (and non-financial) commitment involved in having children whose 
transition to adulthood is delayed. The reproductive attitudes and expectations of couples in 
societies where children become autonomous early, say at the age of 20, are different from 
those of couples living in a society where children achieve full independence at 30. The 
perception of the cost of children is different, and so too are behaviours. A third, more 
subtle effect is that the delay in becoming independent – and the long period during which 
young people, especially men, remain in the family fold – slows down the democratization 
of intra-family relationships, which surveys have shown to be correlated to lower fertility. 
All policies that are effective in reversing the delay, speeding up the transition towards 
independence and bringing forward fertility choices, should therefore be supported, and for 
two reasons. First, there is a positive effect on fertility (with a closing of the gap between 
couples’ expectations and the number of children they have); second, a general contribution 
to economic development because of an earlier entry into the labour market, greater 
mobility and enhanced personal initiative. This brings us back to the usefulness of policies 
that encourage access to jobs and which ensure that these jobs, when they are not 
permanent, are linked to new employment patterns that safeguard continuity in income. The 
shortening of tertiary education envisaged by the ongoing reform is a step in the right 
direction, although the multiplication of different “levels” of study may end up producing 
the opposite effect.   11
Despite appearances, the measures – suggested by the White Paper on Welfare (Ministry 
of Welfare, 2003) – aimed at making it easier for young people to buy a house are not to be 
recommended, because they tie up financial resources and discourage mobility. Public 
resources would be better spent subsidizing rents for young people.  
Like all enduring social changes, the delay in the transition to adulthood produces 
structural adjustments that are then hard to erode or undo, making the task of policies even 
more difficult. Take, for instance, the financial cost of marriage. In the 1990s, according to 
the ISTAT multiscope survey, 73% of couples had a wedding reception with over 100 
guests, and average costs (including various related extras) topped 10,000 euros. Then 
consider the financial commitment of buying and furnishing a house, which becomes the 
life investment; however, this is not made when the family is at their peak in terms of 
earning power but at the beginning of their career. Think also of an overlapping, multi-
layered education system that absorbs a young person’s energy until age 30 or beyond. All 
these factors create obligations and social conventions that perpetuate behaviours which 
then acquire the “status” of normality. 
 
8 – REFORMING THE SYSTEM OF TRANSFERS: A RADICAL PROPOSAL 
 
In Italy, social transfers for health, disability, pensions, the family and children, 
unemployment and housing amount to about 25% of GNP, two percentage points less than 
the EU–15 European average (Eurostat). Almost two thirds (63.4%) of social spending is 
absorbed by pension payments, compared to an EU–15 figure of 46.4%. Not even one 
twenty-fifth of social spending (3.8%) is devoted, as we saw at the beginning, to family and 
childhood support, compared to an EU–15 average of one twelfth (8.2%). In a word, the 
Italian data suggest that the general tendency to make large (and increasing) transfers to the 
elderly and vulnerable, and small (and decreasing) transfers to families and children (and 
therefore to the young) is particularly marked. A reform of the welfare system favourable to 
childbearing must involve, in one way or another, a functional reallocation of transfers 
whereby some people will benefit and others will lose out. It is true that there is a flow of 
resources from the elderly towards the younger generations, and that altruism can act as a 
correcting force in the final destination of resources. But this is no consolation, because 
when carried through to its extreme consequence, it implies the very negation of the 
function of the welfare system as it fails to reduce the gap between the needy and the 
affluent. 
The possible negative effect of current welfare systems on the birth rate (through the 
breaking down of ties of solidarity between parents and children, and between adults and the 
elderly, and due to the emergence of the “negative drift” whereby it is advantageous to have 
a fewer than average number of children) is well described by Harrod (Archives 2001): “if 
there were six children, two might fail to make good in life, another two might be stony-
hearted and indifferent to their parents, but it would be very bad luck if two out of the six 
were not found with means and affection sufficient to keep their parents out of the work-
house. The parents of but two children would be in a much more precarious position. As one 
cause of want after another, industrial accident, old age, sickness, unemployment, have 
come under the care of the public, the need to insure oneself by having children has faded 
out”. There is a clear cure for this: reestablishing the link between reproduction and social 
protection in other ways. 
One radical proposal has been advanced by De Santis (De Santis 1995; 1997; 2003). A 
social protection system might be designed that protects all those who are not of working 
age, i.e. the young, up to alpha years of age (e.g., 18), and the elderly, over beta years of 
age (e.g., 65). Alpha and beta are the result of political choices, ideally varying with the 
survival level so that the proportion of the life span that each individual spends as a young   12
person, as an adult and as an elderly person remains constant, for example ¼, ½, and ¼. The 
main objective of the system is to redistribute income: not from the rich to the poor 
(although it may do something in this respect too, if properly designed) but across one’s 
stages of life, from the productive to the non-productive years. The system is PAYG and can 
therefore only hand out on the basis of the current production of the country. Consistently, 
the only “promises” it makes are relative in two respects, economically and 
demographically.  
Economically speaking, the system is basically a “risk-sharing” one (Musgrave 1981), 
which uses the average net income of the adult as a numeraire [w(1-a)=1, where w=gross 
wage and a=contributory rate]. Young people’s benefit amounts to bY=rY * w(1-a), while 
for the elderly the benefit is bE=rE * w(1-a), where the key policy variables are the 
proportions rY and rE. For example, with rY=30% and rY=60%, child benefit corresponds to 
30% of the average adult income, while pensions are, on average, 60%. Three main 
improvements on existing “risk sharing” systems are worth remarking: 1) child benefits are 
incorporated into the system; 2) individual pensions may differ from average pensions, 
depending on the contributory history of each elderly person; 3) the income of adults, not 
that of employees, is the numeraire, so higher unemployment, for instance, automatically 
translates into lower intergenerational transfers. 
On the demographic front, the main innovation consists in the use of a reference age 
structure (instead of the current age structure) for the calibration of the system, where the 
standard can be taken as the age structure of the current stationary population. This permits 
the system to go virtually unchanged through rough periods, e.g. when the age structure 
fluctuates because of peaks and troughs in the birth rate, on the relatively mild assumption 
that the demographic rate of growth will approach zero in the very long run. 
Obviously, external conditions (survival) and policy choices (alpha,  beta and r) 
determine a balanced contributory rate. For example, with alpha=18, beta=65, rY=0.3 and 
rE=0.6, the rate is 25.4%. De Santis demonstrates that the system is financially balanced 
over the long term, and that if alpha and beta move with e0, the contributory rate that 
society chooses at the outset can remain almost unaltered. Furthermore, the system is fair 
(on average, what you pay in contributions corresponds to what you get back in transfers in 
the course of your life), it does not require economic or demographic forecasts and, if 
properly designed, need not discourage fertility, and may even moderately encourage it, 
through the rY parameter. In other words, it opens up the possibility of recognizing that 
young people are, to some extent, a “public good” (they are the future pension payers). 
More generally, with this system part of the burden of supporting the non-working 
population (including young people) shifts from the family to society; but how great this 
shift is depends on alpha, beta, rY, and rE, i.e. on policy choices that each country wishing to 
adopt the system may adapt to its own needs and preferences. 
This proposal is undoubtedly radical, and while this will not help it to gain widespread 
support, it certainly constitutes an important point of reference conceptually. As regards 
what concerns us here, it may help solve the problem of the “negative drift” of fertility I 
mentioned before, by consistently making child benefits part of the more general 
intergenerational transfer of resources that takes place in each society.  
 
 
9 – REFORMING THE SYSTEM OF TRANSFERS: A PROPOSAL TO SUPPORT 
CHILDREN AND THEIR ENTRY INTO WORKING LIFE 
 
9.1 – A proposal 
 The following proposal is something of an intellectual provocation. The mechanisms 
are only roughly sketched and the financial and juridical mechanics of it would need   13
studying in detail before making a full-blown policy proposal. The proposal does not imply 
a radical reform of the system of transfers. There are seminal traces of this proposal in a 
work by Demeny (Demeny 1986), while the proposals of Ackermann and Alstott and of 
Labour in Britain, despite certain similarities, simply have redistributory aims and adopt 
different mechanisms (Ackerman and Alstott 1999; The Economist 2003). 
In every society, children are brought up by their parents as private goods. A proportion 
of the cost, however, is borne by society, mainly by means of general taxation for schools, 
health and some financial transfers. Quite irrespective of the magnitude of this 
redistribution, which is generally considered modest, also in view of the rapid increase in 
the cost of raising a child, one problem is that the cost of children ends up falling onto the 
shoulders of those who have them, and only a small share (through general taxation) is 
contributed by those who, by choice or necessity, have no children but benefit from the fact 
that children are also a public good. Reducing this “inequity” is difficult and complicated. 
The proposal advanced here has the following basic characteristics:  
-  Over and above the services that the state decides to provide for families and 
children (for schooling, housing, health), there is a “political” recognition of the need to 
support children. 
-  This support is given to the children and not to the parents, even if the latter may 
(as we will see) use part of it. 
-  The support is divided into two parts; the first can be used by families to cover 
(part) of the expense of raising the child, the second part can be used by offspring to 
“invest” in their future when they come of age. 
-  The contribution is, in part, a “loan” that society makes to each newborn child; 
this is repaid in the course of his or her active life. 
-  All individuals are therefore given deferred responsibility for their upbringing; as 
such, the public contribution does not fall either on the families with children, nor, through 
general taxation, on those who do not.  
 
9.2 - How the system works 
Upon presentation of a birth certificate, each newborn child becomes an “account 
holder” (at the same time as the social security number is issued). Until the child comes of 
age (or some other conventional alpha age), an annual sum is paid into the account (the sum 
could be higher for the first year of life), together with accrued interest. Relatives and 
friends can also pay into this account.  
Each year parents or legal representatives can draw on the account up to a certain ceiling 
– let’s say 50% of the amount paid in annually –, which is a contribution to the expense of 
rearing the child. When the child comes of age (or reaches alpha age), he or she can draw 
on the money, using it within a given number of years (let’s say 5 or 10) for certain precise 
purposes: the purchase of certain durable goods (such as a computer), education and training, 
setting up a professional, craft or business activity. 
At the end of the 5- or 10-year period in which the account can be drawn on, anything 
that has not been used returns to the state. The part that has been used is repaid by the 
account holder (through extra Personal Income Tax, salary deductions or some other means) 
in instalments over a long period, approximately the average length of one’s working life 
(let’s say 30 years). The instalments can be graded over time (lower at the beginning, higher 
at the end); certain allowances could be introduced as an equalizing measure for those on 
low incomes; and particular measures could make provision for the disabled, poor and 
insolvent. 
A proposal of this kind would have various advantages. It would send a powerful 
“message” to families and to society in general. It would increase the younger generations’ 
sense of empowerment, which is currently very low. The newborn child is the account   14
holder, quite irrespective of the conditions of his or her birth or whether or not the parents 
are married. The families do not receive a donation but a contribution which (up to 50%) 
represents recognition on the part of the state that “producing” future adults is in the public 
interest. 
The proposal supposes that family behaviour is guided by altruism and that the sum 
drawn on annually is used for the well-being of the children; the fact that this sum, if not 
used, increases what is available to the adult child reinforces this altruism. As the child is 
the account holder, parents drawing on it up to a ceiling of 50% know that they are drawing 
on money that is not theirs. The proposal is fair: you receive during childhood and 
adolescence, and you pay it back during your adult life. It increases the responsibility of the 
family towards the beneficiary, and of the latter towards him or herself. Finally, the proposal 
facilitates the transition to adulthood, speeding up the process of becoming independent. 
There are of course many problems to solve in order to put the scheme into practice, 
concerning the period of transition, its political acceptability, the cost and the juridical and 
financial mechanics of it all. One basic problem is whether the contribution should be 
universalistic, or whether it should exclude, for instance, children born in families above 
certain income levels. In this latter case, however, the scheme would introduce a 
redistributive aim, which is not part of the philosophy of the proposal, and which would 
have to be recouped by general taxation or worked into the “repayment” phase of the loan. 
The cost of the scheme does not appear to be prohibitive. For example, the annual 
contribution made available to families (up to 50% of the total) could absorb what is handed 
out nowadays to families and children in various forms (family allowances, subsidies, etc.); 
the contribution could possibly be increased to bring it in line with the European average 
percentage of GNP (corresponding, in 2000, to about 3,000 euros for each minor). The other 
half would not be issued until the loan is made. An annual contribution of 4,000 euros per 
child (2,000 of which would be set aside) would amount, after 18 years and with a realistic 
interest rate, to about 50,000 euros. This is a significant sum, which, if issued in full and 
simultaneously to everyone who comes of age in a given year, would amount to about 25 




The overview of the previous pages brings us to a number of concluding points. Policy 
aimed at supporting reproduction must necessarily start from an acceptance of the principle 
that children are a private prerogative with benefits for society as a whole, and that the 
system of transfers tends to penalize families with a more than average number of children. 
Various points suggest that a rebalancing of the system cannot be achieved painlessly, and 
that a major redistribution of transfers would be involved. In the general framework of an 
overhauling of the welfare system, there are three other important areas of intervention. One 
is the easing of time and cost restrictions imposed on women who look after their children 
and work at the same time. This also involves a rebalancing of gender asymmetries, which 
are particularly strong in Italy. Another area for action regards the erosion of the syndrome 
of delay, with the triple benefit that young people start contributing to society earlier, life 
and reproductive choices are made at a younger age and the cost of children for the family 
of origin is eased. 
A third area of action, which I have specifically avoided examining, concerns 
improvement of the “environmental” context within which reproductive decisions are made. 
This is a public responsibility (schools, training, play facilities, sport, safety, transport) but 
also a private one. The more favourable this context is for families with children, the better 
the cost-benefits balance of reproduction. The role of the private sector can also be 
important in this area. Restaurants with family menus, hotels with special family deals and   15
suitable facilities, transport companies with all-in tickets, parks and museums with facilities 
for children, factories and offices with nurseries… there is plenty of scope for imagination 
here. Collective action in this direction could contribute to modifying culture and values. Do 
we want storks to visit? If so, we should allow them to fly, without shooting them down.  
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